

STATE OF OHIO  
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

RANDALL J. MEYER, INSPECTOR GENERAL

REPORT OF  
INVESTIGATION



AGENCY: OHIO DEPARTMENT OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES  
FILE ID NO.: 2023-CA00011  
DATE OF REPORT: DECEMBER 19, 2024

## The Office of the Ohio Inspector General ... The State Watchdog


*“Safeguarding integrity in state government”*

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Statutory authority for conducting such investigations is defined in *Ohio Revised Code §121.41* through *121.50*. A *Report of Investigation* is issued based on the findings of the Office, and copies are delivered to the Governor of Ohio and the director of the agency subject to the investigation. At the discretion of the Inspector General, copies of the report may also be forwarded to law enforcement agencies or other state agencies responsible for investigating, auditing, reviewing, or evaluating the management and operation of state agencies. The *Report of Investigation* by the Ohio Inspector General is a public record under *Ohio Revised Code §149.43* and related sections of *Chapter 149*. It is available to the public for a fee that does not exceed the cost of reproducing and delivering the report.

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The Inspector General’s Office remains dedicated to the principle that no public servant, regardless of rank or position, is above the law, and the strength of our government is built on the solid character of the individuals who hold the public trust.



Randall J. Meyer  
Ohio Inspector General



STATE OF OHIO  
**OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL**

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RANDALL J. MEYER, INSPECTOR GENERAL

## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

**FILE ID NUMBER:** 2023-CA00011

**SUBJECT NAMES/POSITIONS:** Andrew Kerobo  
Seasonal Teleservices Representative  
Former Randstad Subcontractor

Deonta Belser  
Co-conspirator

**AGENCY:** Ohio Department of Job and Family Services

**BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION:** Referral

**ALLEGATIONS:** Criminal Conduct

**INITIATED:** August 3, 2023

**DATE OF REPORT:** December 19, 2024

## **PREFACE**

The subjects in this report, Andrew Kerobo, Deonta Belser, and other recruiters that were involved in the scheme to defraud the State of Ohio were indicted on December 18, 2024, by a Franklin County Grand Jury. Due to the ongoing criminal cases, the Office of the Ohio Inspector General is issuing this preliminary report of investigation, which will be superseded by a comprehensive report to be released at a later date in order to ensure the integrity of the criminal justice proceedings.

## **INITIAL ALLEGATION AND COMPLAINT SUMMARY**

On August 3, 2023, the Office of the Ohio Inspector General joined an ongoing investigation conducted by the Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP) and the U.S. Department of Labor Office of Inspector General (DOLIG) into the alleged improper actions of Andrew Kerobo, a seasonal teleservices representative (STR) who worked for Randstad<sup>1</sup> and was supervised by Harte Hanks, Inc. to process Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) claims. Referral documents provided to OSHP and DOLIG by the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) specifically alleged that Kerobo appeared to have engaged in fraudulent activity involving his processing of PUA claims, which resulted in improper payments to over 300 individuals totaling approximately \$6.8 million.

## **PANDEMIC UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE (PUA) INVESTIGATIVE GROUP**

In 2020, because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the increased unemployment of millions of Americans, Congress passed various programs to address the crisis, including the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) program. The PUA program expanded and loosened eligibility unemployment requirements for recipients. Consequently, the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS), the agency responsible for distributing PUA benefits in Ohio, received an unprecedented number of unemployment compensation claims. This increase in claims necessitated ODJFS to hire intermittent and temporary contracted workers to process the claims. In fiscal year 2021, ODJFS disbursed approximately \$7.6 billion in pandemic unemployment benefits and later, ODJFS identified millions of dollars of the disbursements as fraudulent. To address the rampant fraud connected to the PUA program, an investigative group

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<sup>1</sup> Randstad is a staffing agency that connects job seekers with employers.

was established that consisted of the Office of the Ohio Inspector General; Ohio State Highway Patrol; U.S. Department of Labor Office of Inspector General; and the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services. In addition, the Cincinnati Police Department, the United States Postal Inspection Service, and the United States Secret Service provided information that was used in this investigation.

## **APPLICABLE RULES, POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES**

### *Confidentiality of ODJFS Information*

Ohio Revised Code (ORC) §4141.21 states that, except as provided in ORC §4141.162 and subject to ORC §4141.43,

... the information maintained by the director of job and family services or furnished to the director by employers or employees pursuant to this chapter is for the exclusive use and information of the department of job and family services in the discharge of its duties and shall not be open to the public ... .

As such, the Office of the Ohio Inspector General did not include in this report of investigation any information subject to the provisions of Ohio Revised Code §4141.21 that was obtained from ODJFS during the investigation.

## **BACKGROUND**

### *The Ohio Department of Job and Family Services*

The Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) improves the well-being of Ohio's workforce and families by promoting economic self-sufficiency and ensuring the safety of Ohio's most vulnerable citizens. The department administers programs that provide public assistance, protects child welfare, ensures payment of child support, assists individuals with employment and in preparing for the workforce, provides benefits to the unemployed, and supervises the administration of federal programs and funding at the local level. The direct delivery of services is administered by ODJFS, a combination of joint and individual county departments of job and family services, and local agencies.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Source: Biennial budget documents.

The ODJFS Office of Unemployment Insurance Operations (ODJFS OUI) is responsible for administering the State of Ohio’s Unemployment Insurance Program for workers and businesses. The ODJFS Benefit Payment Control (ODJFS BPC) section is part of ODJFS OUI and is responsible for promoting and maintaining, “... the integrity of the Unemployment Insurance Program through the prevention, early detection, investigation, enforcement and recovery of improper unemployment insurance benefits.”<sup>3</sup>

*Pandemic Unemployment Assistance Program (PUA)*

The Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act<sup>4</sup> was a \$2.2 trillion economic stimulus bill passed by the 116th U.S. Congress and was signed into law on March 27, 2020. The CARES Act included provisions for the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) Program. The PUA program provided temporary benefits and support to self-employed individuals, independent contractors, and others who did not qualify for traditional unemployment benefits and had lost work due to COVID-19 related reasons. Additionally, the PUA program provided temporary benefits and support to workers whose earnings averaged less than \$280 per week in their former jobs and permitted qualified applicants to receive these benefits for up to 39 weeks. The CARES Act stipulated that the distribution of PUA benefits to individuals was to end on December 31, 2020. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the ODJFS Office of Unemployment Insurance Operations (ODJFS OUI) was responsible for the distribution of PUA benefits to qualified individuals in Ohio.

During the period when PUA benefits were available for distribution, ODJFS posted on their website<sup>5</sup> the requirement that PUA applicants self-certify that they met a COVID-19 related reason for their unemployment. The U.S. Department of Labor issued guidance and defined PUA eligibility to three groups of people:

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<sup>3</sup> Source: Benefit Payment Control | Office of Unemployment Insurance Operations | Ohio Department of Job and Family Services.

<sup>4</sup> The text of this legislation can be found at: Text - S.3548 - 116th Congress (2019-2020): CARES Act | Congress.gov | Library of Congress.

<sup>5</sup> <https://jfs.ohio.gov/ouio/pdf/COVID-19-CARES-Act-Reasons.pdf>

- Those previously receiving traditional unemployment benefits who refused to return to work or refused an offer of work because the workplace was not in compliance with local, state, or national health and safety standards directly related to COVID-19
- Those who provided services to an educational institution or educational service agency and were fully or partially unemployed due to COVID-19 related reasons
- Those who were laid-off or had their work hours reduced due to COVID-19 reasons

On December 27, 2020, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021,<sup>6</sup> was signed into law and extended the expiration date set by the CARES Act for the payment of PUA benefits to qualified applicants from December 31, 2020, to March 14, 2021. The Act further extended the number of weeks an eligible applicant could receive these benefits from 39 weeks to 50 weeks.

Additionally, to strengthen the integrity of the PUA program, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, amended the CARES Act by:

- Requiring states to verify the identity of applicants
- Requiring applicants to substantiate employment or self-employment, and wages earned or paid, to confirm eligibility for pandemic unemployment assistance no later than 90 days from the date of application

On March 11, 2021, the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021<sup>7</sup> was signed into law and extended the payment of PUA benefits to qualified individuals from March 14, 2021, to September 6, 2021, and extended the maximum weeks an eligible applicant could receive these benefits from 50 to 70 weeks. The State of Ohio ended the PUA program on September 4, 2021.

### *PUA Claim Processing*

The basic steps to process a PUA claim were:

1. The Claimant Applied for Benefits: This was the initial step in the PUA claims process and required the claimant to: complete a claim application questionnaire; enter their

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<sup>6</sup> The text of this legislation can be found at: H.R.133 - 116th Congress (2019-2020): Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 | Congress.gov | Library of Congress.

<sup>7</sup> The text of this legislation can be found at: H.R.1319 - 117th Congress (2021-2022): American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 | Congress.gov | Library of Congress.

personal, demographic and work history information; adjust the start date of the claim to be the last date the claimant worked/onset of COVID-19 date (i.e., called “backdating”); upload all their ODJFS-required documentation into the claims system; and to submit the claim.

2. ODJFS Adjudication: After the claimant submitted the claim to ODJFS, the adjudication step was the initial determination made by ODJFS on the claim based on the accuracy and completeness of the claimant’s application and uploaded documents.
3. ODJFS Redetermination (if applicable): This was the process used when a claim was initially adjudicated as “Ineligible” and the claimant appealed the initial decision. When this appeal occurred, the claim was sent to either the appeals team or the redetermination team for further review.
4. Processing for Payment: Once the claimant was found to be eligible for benefits, ODJFS performed steps to release benefit payments to the claimant by either direct deposit or by “ReliaCard®,” which is Ohio’s unemployment-specific debit card.
5. Payment Release: The claimant received their benefit payment by direct deposit, or the funds were loaded onto their ReliaCard® for immediate use.



### *US Bank ReliaCard®*

Ohio claimants have the option of receiving their unemployment benefits as a direct deposit into a current bank account or in the form of a debit card which is issued as a US Bank ReliaCard®; Ohio’s unemployment-specific debit card. Once ODJFS determines a claim as eligible, ODJFS contacts US Bank ReliaCard® who then mails the card to the claimant. ODJFS then deposits the approved benefit amount to the card.

Claimants can make purchases with the US Bank ReliaCard® anywhere Visa® and Mastercard® debit cards are accepted or can withdraw their PUA funds in the form of cash from bank ATMs. The US Bank ReliaCard® does not require a personal identification number or PIN for signature-




based purchases should the claimant choose credit when making the purchase. However, a PIN is needed for debit card purchases and cash withdrawals from ATMs. The four-digit PIN is created by the cardholder when activating the card.

### *Deloitte Consulting LLP*

Deloitte Consulting LLP (Deloitte) provides a variety of services to business and governmental entities. As a direct result of the COVID-19 pandemic, ODJFS contracted with Deloitte to assist ODJFS in administering Pandemic Unemployment Assistance to Ohioans.

### *Harte Hanks Inc.*

Harte Hanks Inc. (Harte Hanks) describes itself as a marketing service, customer care, fulfillment and logistics company.<sup>8</sup> During the COVID-19 pandemic, Deloitte contracted with Harte Hanks to provide manpower to fulfill the ODJFS contract.



### *Randstad US, LLC*

Randstad US, LLC (Randstad) is a staffing agency that provides job seekers with employers. Randstad subcontracted with Harte Hanks to provide additional workers to fulfill the ODJFS contract. Harte Hanks Inc. also provided supervisors for the PUA subcontractors that were provided by Randstad. Kerobo, a subcontractor employed by Randstad, was supervised by a Harte Hanks, Inc. employee.

## **SUBJECTS OF INVESTIGATION**

### ***Andrew Kerobo***

Andrew Kerobo (Kerobo) was a temporary contract employee hired by Randstad as a seasonal teleservices representative (STR). Kerobo worked remotely from his family home in Cincinnati, Ohio, taking inbound phone calls from Ohioans requiring assistance regarding their PUA claims. Kerobo did not have the authority to “adjudicate” or resolve any issues which could trigger a payment or prevent a claim from being paid. Call takers, like Kerobo, were also not permitted to

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<sup>8</sup> [www.Hartehanks.com](http://www.Hartehanks.com)

“redetermine monetary”<sup>9</sup> which involved taking action to increase or decrease the weekly PUA payments on a claim. Kerobo’s employment with Randstad started on June 22, 2020, and was terminated, effective September 5, 2020. After Kerobo’s termination, his login credentials for the pandemic unemployment system database were not deactivated and Kerobo continued to log in to the system and make changes to and adjudicate PUA claims until December 10, 2020. From Kerobo’s first login to the pandemic unemployment system database during his tenure with Randstad up until his last improper and unauthorized login months after his termination with Randstad, Kerobo improperly accessed 448 claims and released \$6,864,263 in fraudulent funds as a result of manipulated and fabricated claims.

***Deonta Belser AKA “Tay Ocho”***

Deonta Belser (Belser) and Kerobo were teammates in 2018 on the Highland Community College Men’s varsity football team in Highland, Kansas. Later, Belser transferred to Bowling Green State University (BGSU) where he continued playing football until he withdrew and moved back to his hometown of Cincinnati during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Investigators discovered Kerobo



Source: <https://scottieathletics.com>

and Belser had conspired in 2020 to release fraudulent pandemic unemployment funds. Belser was tasked with crowd-sourcing claimants, gathering their information and then relaying that claimant information to Kerobo, who would then search for and access the claim in the uFACTS database using his login credentials provided to him by Randstad. Kerobo would then improperly release PUA benefit funds for that claimant. Both Belser and Kerobo then took from these claimants a percentage of the funds that were improperly released.

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<sup>9</sup> Redetermine monetary is a term used by ODJFS in identifying certain actions taken by a PUA worker. Only trained workers with the proper authority were allowed to determine if legitimate submitted documents supported an increase in PUA payments based upon income prior to COVID-19.


## **INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY**

The Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) reported to the Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP) and the U.S. Department of Labor Office of Inspector General (DOLIG) the alleged improper actions of Andrew Kerobo, a seasonal teleservices representative (STR) who worked for Randstad<sup>10</sup> and was supervised by Harte Hanks, Inc. to process Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) claims. ODJFS provided documents to OSHP and DOLIG related to their review of Kerobo's activities in the Unemployment Framework for Automated Claim & Tax Services (uFACTS). The uFACTS database maintains an audit trail for ODJFS claim files. According to ODJFS' initial review of Kerobo's activities from June 22, 2020, to his termination date of September 5, 2020, Kerobo improperly searched for, backdated, and/or redetermined 13 PUA claims by voiding issues on ineligible claims, which resulted in the release of \$36,803 in previously denied funds. Kerobo's actions were outside the scope and authority of his job duties as a subcontracted STR. Investigators learned that Kerobo's login credentials for the uFACTS database were not deactivated following his termination from Randstad, effective September 5, 2020, and that he performed unauthorized accesses into, made changes to and adjudicated numerous PUA claims until his last unauthorized login on December 10, 2020. From Kerobo's first login during his employment with Randstad up until his last unauthorized access/login after he was terminated, investigators determined Kerobo manipulated and/or fabricated a total of 448 claims, releasing \$6,864,263 in fraudulent pandemic unemployment assistance payments.

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<sup>10</sup> Randstad is a staffing agency that connects job seekers with employers.

## FRAUDULENT PUA PAYMENTS RELEASED AS A RESULT OF KEROBO'S ACTIONS



### **Kerobo Interviewed by Ohio State Highway Patrol<sup>11</sup>**

On April 18, 2023, Kerobo was interviewed by investigators with the Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP). After denying any wrongdoing, Kerobo admitted to conducting unauthorized accesses to the uFACTS database after he was terminated, and that he performed the following illegal actions:

- Fabricated four counterfeit claims
- Backdated the four counterfeit claims
- Listed his apartment address in Columbus, OH, as the mailing address on the four counterfeit claims.

Kerobo's actions released \$118,983 in fraudulent PUA benefit funds deposited onto four ReliaCards® that were mailed to his apartment in Columbus. Once the ReliaCards® were in his possession, Kerobo used the \$118,983 in fraudulent PUA funds for his own personal use.

<sup>11</sup> OSHP provided to the Office of the Ohio Inspector General an external hard drive of electronic evidence, including Kerobo's interview, gathered by OSHP and DOLIG prior to the Ohio Inspector General joining the ongoing investigation.

During his interview with OSHP, Kerobo was asked specifically about a claimant by the name of Deonta Belser (Belser) who went by the name, “Tay Ocho.” Kerobo insisted that he only knew Belser as a “Facebook friend.” Kerobo denied he was propositioned by anyone, including Belser, to use his unauthorized access to the uFACTS database to fraudulently release PUA benefits in exchange for monetary kickbacks. However, OSHP investigators reminded Kerobo that Belser’s claim was the very first PUA claim Kerobo accessed and manipulated after he was terminated by Randstad. Kerobo also failed to explain to investigators why Belser paid him large lump sums of money through Cash App<sup>®</sup>, the first transaction being after Kerobo accessed and fraudulently manipulated Belser’s claim. During his interview, OSHP investigators showed Kerobo the \$3,000 Cash App<sup>®</sup> transaction made to him from Belser. OSHP investigators also noted to him that they found many claimants who had paid Belser via Cash App<sup>®</sup> and immediately thereafter, Belser transferred money to him (Kerobo) via Cash App<sup>®</sup>. OSHP investigators told Kerobo, “He [Belser] had to get paid in order for you to get paid ... .” Kerobo impulsively responded, “Well, yea ... ,” and then quickly contradicted, “Well, I mean, I didn’t get paid ... .” OSHP noted to Kerobo, “It went to your [Cash App<sup>®</sup>] account.”

### **Office of the Ohio Inspector General Joins the Ongoing Investigation**


On August 3, 2023, the Office of the Ohio Inspector General (OIG) joined the investigation being conducted by OSHP and DOLIG to provide further inquiry and analysis into the alleged fraudulent actions of Andrew Kerobo. OIG investigators examined and evaluated Belser’s PUA claim as well as the claims Kerobo accessed and manipulated thereafter for any financial connections evident between Kerobo and other PUA benefit fund recipients. OIG investigators also reviewed and analyzed Cash App<sup>®</sup> and banking records provided by OSHP, and additional Cash App<sup>®</sup> and banking records independently obtained via subpoenas. From their review of these records, OIG investigators discovered many instances of significant cash transfers from PUA claimants and/or recruiters<sup>12</sup> to Belser, and afterwards, subsequent significant cash transfers to Kerobo. OIG investigators concluded Kerobo and Belser had conspired in 2020 to release fraudulent pandemic unemployment funds starting less than a week after Kerobo’s termination

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
<sup>12</sup> A recruiter was a person that Belser enlisted to bring more PUA claimants into the fraud. Both Belser and the recruiter kept a portion of the fraudulent PUA monies as their “fee.” Belser kept enough money for himself and Kerobo, and the remaining money was paid to the recruiter, who either took their cut and gave the rest to the claimant, or chose to keep it all after Kerobo and Belser’s fee was paid.

from Randstad. Belser was tasked with crowd-sourcing claimants, gathering their information and then relaying that claimant information to Kerobo, who would then search for and access the claim in the uFACTS database using his login credentials provided to him by Randstad. Kerobo would then improperly release PUA benefit funds for that claimant. Both Belser and Kerobo then took from these claimants a percentage of the funds that were improperly released. OIG investigators determined a direct correlation between the contemporaneous times of these significant cash transfers to Kerobo’s unauthorized accesses and logged audit trail activity in the uFACTS database.


The following are examples of four different claims Kerobo had improperly accessed and fraudulently redetermined in 2020 and the subsequent significant cash transfers that had occurred related to each claim:




On September 15, 2020, Kerobo accessed and redetermined a PUA claim of a claimant and/or recruiter. On September 17, 2020, the claimant and/or recruiter sent Belser \$2,000 via Cash App® and later, Belser sent Kerobo \$1,000 via Cash App®.



On September 17, 2020, Kerobo accessed and redetermined a PUA claim of a claimant and/or recruiter. On September 20, 2020, the claimant and/or recruiter sent Belser \$2,000 via Apple Pay® and later, Belser sent Kerobo \$1,000 via Apple Pay®.



On September 27, 2020, Kerobo accessed and redetermined a PUA claim of a claimant and/or recruiter. On October 1, 2020, the claimant and/or recruiter sent Belser \$2,000 via Cash App® and later, Belser sent Kerobo \$1,000 via Cash App®.



On October 2, 2020, Kerobo accessed and redetermined a PUA claim of a claimant and/or recruiter. On October 6, 2020, the claimant and/or recruiter sent Belser \$2,500 via Cash App® and later, Belser sent Kerobo \$750 via Cash App®.

Consequently, OIG investigators’ findings supported OSHP’s statement during Kerobo’s interview that Belser had to be paid first by a claimant (and/or recruiter) in order for Kerobo to be paid. Additionally, from their review of Kerobo’s electronic banking records, OIG investigators confirmed that Kerobo had received money from Belser through both Cash App® and Apple Pay®, refuting Kerobo’s statement during his OSHP interview that he “... didn’t get paid” for participating in the scheme with Belser to defraud the State of Ohio.

**Evidence Collected After the Office of the Ohio Inspector General Joined the Ongoing Investigation**

The Office of the Ohio Inspector General, OSHP, and DOLIG collected additional evidence from multiple sources, including but not limited to:

*Electronic Search Warrants:*

- Belser’s Instagram profile and records associated with it
- Belser’s Facebook profile and the electronic evidence associated with it
- Belser’s iCloud accounts

*Subpoenas were Issued for:*

- Belser’s banking records (Fifth Third, Stride, Green Dot, etc.)



- Claimant/Recruiter Cash App® account records
- Claimant/Recruiter Bank account records
- Claimant/Recruiter subscriber information only for Yahoo email addresses
- Claimant/Recruiter subscriber information only for Google email addresses
- Subscriber information of IP addresses associated with Belser and Kerobo's fraudulent activity together.
- US Bank ReliaCard® cardholder information and transaction history for ReliaCards® associated with Belser and Krobo's fraudulent activity together
- Claimant/Recruiter phone records
- Claimant/Recruiter hotel reservations during the timeframe in question
- Belser's hotel reservations during the timeframe in question

### **Fraud Breakdown**

#### *Fraudulent PUA Claims Attributable to Kerobo Only, Prior to His Termination from Randstad*

Prior to Kerobo's termination from Randstad effective September 5, 2020, Kerobo accessed and manipulated a total of 13 PUA claims, releasing a total of \$36,803 in fraudulent PUA benefits.

#### *Fraudulent PUA Claims Attributable to Kerobo Only, After His Termination from Randstad*

During Kerobo's interview with OSHP, Kerobo admitted that after he was terminated by Randstad, he performed unauthorized accesses to the uFACTS database in which he created and manipulated four counterfeit PUA claims, resulting in the fraudulent release of \$118,983 in PUA monies. Kerobo arranged for the deposit of these fraudulent monies onto four ReliaCards® which were mailed directly to his apartment in Columbus, OH. Kerobo did not attribute this fraudulent activity to anyone but himself; therefore, investigators concluded he alone was responsible for the fraudulent release of the \$118,983 in PUA funds.

#### *Fraudulent PUA Claims with Direct Evidence to Both Kerobo and Belser*

From the findings of their analysis of independently obtained evidence and their review of evidence provided by OSHP and DOLOIG, the Office of the Ohio Inspector General determined Belser and Kerobo had worked together to defraud the State of Ohio. OIG investigators found that Belser and claimants and/or recruiters communicated and coordinated fraudulent activities

involving PUA claims. The evidence of their fraudulent actions is supported by records tracking their activity; the specific timeframes of those communications and activities; and payments disbursed to and between all parties, including claimants/recruiters, Belser, and Kerobo. In total, investigators attributed 146 fraudulent PUA claims directly to Kerobo, co-conspirator Belser, and claimants and/or recruiters, that were accessed and fraudulently manipulated by Kerobo after he was terminated by Randstad but continued to have access to the uFACTS database, fraudulently releasing a total of \$2,857,274 in PUA funds.

#### Additional Fraudulent PUA Claims

OIG investigators identified 285 fraudulent claims totaling \$3,851,203 that were accessed and fraudulently manipulated by Kerobo after he was terminated by Randstad. However, investigators were not able to find evidence that showed Kerobo was paid and/or directly benefitted from releasing PUA funds on these 285 fraudulent claims. Investigators did ascertain that the 285 claims, like the 146 aforementioned claims, contained one or more common data points associated with persons known to be involved in the scheme to defraud the State of Ohio, such as:

- Cincinnati address
- Bowling Green address
- Evidence of Belser and/or Kerobo's personal relationships with claimants through social media, bank accounts, etc.

#### Summary of Fraudulent Claims

From Kerobo's first login during his employment with Randstad to his last unauthorized access to the uFACTS database after he was terminated, OIG investigators determined Kerobo manipulated and/or fabricated a total of 448 claims, including claims with evidence directly related to co-conspirator Belser, claimants, and/or recruiter(s) and claims with known data points, resulting in the fraudulent release of \$6,864,263 in pandemic unemployment assistance payments.

<b>SUMMARY OF FRAUDULENT CLAIMS</b>		
Pre-Termination from Randstad Claims	\$36,803.00	13 Claims
Claims Directly Related to Kerobo and Belser/Recruiter(s) (Post-Termination)	\$2,857,274.00	146 Claims
Kerobo-Only Claims (Post-Termination)	\$118,983.00	4 Claims
Additional Claims with Known Data Points (Post-Termination)	\$3,851,203.00	285 Claims
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		
	<b>\$6,864,263.00</b>	<b>448 Claims</b>

**REFERRALS**

The Office of the Ohio Inspector General previously referred this report of investigation to the Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, and is currently referring the report to the Ohio Auditor of State for consideration.



STATE OF OHIO  
**OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL**

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RANDALL J. MEYER, INSPECTOR GENERAL

**NAME OF REPORT: Ohio Department of Job and Family Services**

**FILE ID #: 2023-CA00011**

**KEEPER OF RECORDS CERTIFICATION**

**This is a true and correct copy of the report which is required to be prepared by the Office of the Ohio Inspector General pursuant to Section 121.42 of the Ohio Revised Code.**

**Jill Jones**  
**KEEPER OF RECORDS**

**CERTIFIED**  
**December 19, 2024**

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